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I. INTRODUCTION
Trespass to chattels is a somewhat vague tort action that traditionally
arises out of the intentional and unauthorized dispossession, use, or
interference with the tangible chattel of another.1 Claims predicated on
this common law tort have always required the showing of some
intentional physical damage to or, in the alternative, dispossession of the
chattel.2 However, in a recent California appellate decision,3 the court
departed from the strict common law requirements and upheld a
permanent injunction on the grounds of trespass to chattels,4 thereby
enjoining conduct that would have traditionally fallen outside the
purview of the established trespass doctrines. In doing so, the court
created a new tort, formerly known as trespass to chattels, but no longer
recognizable as such, and destroyed the very elements, reasons, and
foundations upon which that tort had been established. The court’s
decision stands in opposition to all prior legal authority on point, is
unjustified, creates absurd results, and has enormous adverse
consequences. This Casenote addresses the court’s erroneous and
unjustified application of trespass to chattels in an area where it is
completely inapplicable.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
Over a two-year period, Kourosh Kenneth Hamidi, a former Intel
Corporation5 engineer and the principal spokesperson of Former and

1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965).
2. See infra Part III.A–B.
3. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Ct. App. 2001), review granted,
43 P.3d 587 (Cal. 2002).
4. Id. at 246.
5. Intel Corporation was founded in 1968 and built the world’s first microprocessor in
1971. Intel Corp., About Intel, at http://www.intel.com/intel/index.htm?iid=Corporate+
Header_About& (last visited Dec. 19, 2002). Intel Corporation is one of the world’s
largest and most successful developers of computer chips, motherboards, systems,
software, networking, and communications equipment. “Intel’s mission is to be the
preeminent building block supplier to the Internet economy.” Intel Corp., Corporate
Overview, at http://www.intel.com/pressroom/CorpOverview.htm (last visited Dec. 19,
2002). Intel currently employs over 80,000 employees, achieved over $26.5 billion in
revenues in 2001, and is ranked forty-first in the Fortune 500. Intel Corp., About Intel, at
http://www.intel.com/intel/index.htm?iid=Corporate+Header_About& (last visited Dec. 19,
2002).
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Current Employees of Intel (FACE Intel),6 sent six unsolicited e-mail
messages7 targeting up to 35,000 Intel employees at their work e-mail
addresses, which were maintained on Intel’s privately owned computer
system.8
These six messages expressed Hamidi’s view that Intel was engaged
in abusive and discriminatory employment practices.9 The e-mail
messages did not originate on Intel’s property nor were they sent to
Intel’s property. The e-mail messages were sent over the Internet and
received by an Internet server.10 The recipients were given the
opportunity to be removed from Hamidi’s mailing list; however, only
450 availed themselves of that opportunity.11
Perhaps disturbed by the content12 of Hamidi’s messages, Intel sent
6. FACE Intel describes itself as a California nonprofit organization consisting of
both current and former Intel employees. See FACE Intel, Intel’s Lawsuit Against Ken
Hamidi, at http://www.faceintel.com/intellawsuit.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2002). It was
created to provide a discussion forum for Intel employees to express concerns and post
allegations of Intel’s discriminatory and oppressive human rights practices. FACE Intel,
at http://www.faceintel.com (last visited Oct. 13, 2002). The organization’s selfproclaimed mission is the dedication to “practicing and promoting peaceful and nonviolent opposition to unjust Human Resources policies and practices of Intel” and further
“to influence Intel to . . . stop age, disability, race, gender, and ethnicity discriminations.”
Id. FACE Intel is a defaulting party to the original action and has not appealed the
court’s decision. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246.
7. Hamidi’s messages contained a brief description regarding the existence,
purpose, and goals of FACE Intel and provided the recipients with the Internet address
for the organization’s Web site. See E-mail Messages Sent to Intel Employees: Intel vs.
Hamidi, at http://www.intelhamidi.com/emailmessages.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2002).
8. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246–47.
9. For the content of Hamidi’s messages, see E-mail Messages Sent to Intel
Employees: Intel vs. Hamidi, at http://www.intelhamidi.com/emailmessages.htm (last
visited Dec. 19, 2002). Hamidi’s efforts to bring public recognition to the alleged
discriminatory practices of Intel earned him Disgruntled Magazine’s title of “1997
Disgruntled Employee of the Year.” See FACE Intel, Disgruntled Names Former Intel
Engineer Ken Hamidi the 1997 Disgruntled Employee of the Year, at http://www.face
intel.com/articlesarchives.htm#DISGRUNTLED (last visited Oct. 13, 2002).
10. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247. Intel’s e-mail system is connected to the
Internet and is used for “communications between Intel employees and its customers and
vendors.” See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, No. 98AS05067, 1999 WL 450944, at *1 (Cal.
App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999) (unpublished opinion). Intel, however, does permit
its employees “reasonable personal use of Intel’s equipment for sending and receiving
personal e-mail.” Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 250.
11. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247. Given the ability of the employees to easily
remove themselves from Hamidi’s mailing list, the significance of any alleged trespass is
questionable.
12. Arguably, if Hamidi had been praising Intel’s employment practices and
procedures, Intel would never have argued trespass because there was no physical harm
to Intel’s system. Therefore, perhaps it is not the trespass that Intel is complaining about,
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Hamidi a demand letter directing that he stop e-mailing Intel employees.
Hamidi refused. Intel attempted to prevent Hamidi’s messages from
reaching its employees’ electronic mailboxes by various technological
means, but Hamidi was able to evade their security measures and
continued to e-mail Intel’s employees.13 Having failed to block
Hamidi’s messages or to persuade him to refrain from sending them,
Intel filed suit against Hamidi, alleging trespass to chattels and seeking a
permanent injunction.14
B. Procedural History
1. The Trial Court
The Superior Court of California, Sacramento County, granted Intel
summary judgment on the trespass to chattels claim and issued a
permanent injunction against Hamidi, enjoining him from sending
electronic messages to Intel employees at their place of work.15 The
court found that Intel (1) had asked Hamidi not to e-mail its employees,
(2) had no effective self-help option, and (3) had suffered injury because
it had devoted employee time in attempts to block the e-mail messages.
The court thus held that Intel was entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law on the trespass to chattels claim.16
but the content of Hamidi’s messages. If that is the case, Intel would then be attempting
to turn a libel claim into a trespass claim in an effort to silence Hamidi’s speech.
13. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246–47.
14. Hamidi, 1999 WL 450944, at *3. Originally, Intel had also filed a nuisance
claim for damages but withdrew it voluntarily and waived its claim for damages. Id. at
*1. The California Supreme Court has held that all intangible intrusions that do not
cause physical damage to property must be dealt with as nuisance rather than trespass.
See Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 649 P.2d 922, 924 (Cal. 1982). Electromagnetic
waves have been held to be such intangible intrusions, covered under nuisance law and
not trespass. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 695–96 (Cal.
1996). Electronic signals, such as Internet e-mail messages, that travel over phone lines
or cable transmission lines into a private computer system consist of nothing more than
the same electromagnetic waves discussed in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. See, e.g.,
HOWARD GEORGI, THE PHYSICS OF WAVES 187–92 (1993); 2 DAVID HALLIDAY & ROBERT
RESNICK, PHYSICS § 41-4 (3d ed. 1986); 18 MCGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY 555–62 (8th ed. 1997).
15. Hamidi, 1999 WL 450944, at *3.
16. Id. at *1–2. The permanent injunction permanently restrained and enjoined
“defendants, their agents, servants, assigns, employees, officers, directors, and all those
acting in concert for or with defendants . . . from sending unsolicited e-mail to addresses
on INTEL’s computer systems.” Id. at *3; see also Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247.
After the court enjoined Hamidi from sending any further e-mail messages to Intel,
Hamidi dressed himself in a “Pony Express rider outfit” and hand delivered two more email messages to Intel’s headquarters, one on a floppy disk (which Intel said was too
expensive to deliver to its employees) and one printed out on 40,000 sheets of paper.
First Pony E-mail Express Delivery: Intel vs. Hamidi, at http://www.intelhamidi.com/
firstdelivery.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2002); Second Pony E-mail Express Delivery:
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2. The Court of Appeal
A divided three-judge panel of the court of appeal, giving more
deference to the trial court’s ruling than to all other legal authority on
point, affirmed the trial court’s ruling and upheld the permanent
injunction17 over Justice Kolkey’s dissent.18 In short, the court held that
although Intel was unable to demonstrate any harm to its chattels
necessary to trigger a damage award, the act of disrupting Intel’s
business by unauthorized use of Intel’s computers amounted to
trespass.19 The court inappropriately applied the definition of trespass to
chattels as given in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as occurring when
someone intentionally meddles with another’s chattel in a way that is
harmful to the owner’s materially valuable interest in the chattel.20 The
court held that even if Intel could not demonstrate any actual harm or
loss sufficient to support an award of nominal damages, it was
nevertheless entitled to injunctive relief.21 Intel proved to the court’s
satisfaction that it—not the chattel—was hurt by the loss of productivity
of distracted workers and by the time and effort its security department
expended trying to stop the e-mail messages.22 The court concluded that
Intel proved Hamidi was “disrupting its business by using its property
and therefore is entitled to injunctive relief based on a theory of trespass
to chattels.”23 In so holding, the court radically departed from the
existing California common law requirements and created a new tort
where harm to the plaintiff’s allegedly trespassed chattels need not be
proven.

Intel vs. Hamidi, at http://www.intelhamidi.com/seconddelivery.htm (last visited Oct.
11, 2002).
17. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 258.
18. Id. at 258–65 (Kolkey, J., dissenting)
19. Id. at 249. Asking for an injunction instead of damages does not free the
plaintiff from the burden of showing any injury. An injunction is granted only after an
injury has been established and where that injury is so irreparable that a damage award
would be insufficient. See infra note 36.
20. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 248.
21. Id. at 249.
22. Id. at 249–50. The dissent opined: “[I]t is not too much to ask that trespass to
chattel continue to require some injury to the chattel (or at least to the possessory interest
in the chattel) in order to maintain the action.” Id. at 258 (Kolkey, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 249.
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III. DEPARTURE FROM EXISTING CALIFORNIA COMMON LAW
A. The Actual Injury Requirement
In its decision, the court applied the doctrine of trespass to chattels
without any finding of actual harm to the chattel involved or, alternately,
without any finding of interference with the owner’s ability to use that
chattel. The court abandoned the distinction between trespass to real
property and trespass to chattels, effectually merging the two and
radically rewriting the trespass to chattels doctrine under California
law.24
The common law has always distinguished trespass to real property
from trespass to chattels. In order for a plaintiff to maintain a trespass to
real property action, there is no requirement that the plaintiff prove
actual injury to the property.25 In contrast, the tort of trespass to chattels
has always required that the plaintiff prove sufficient actual injury to the
chattel in question or, alternatively, some injury to the owner’s ability to
use or possess that chattel.26 Accordingly, in order for a plaintiff to
24. The defendant and legal commentators, such as Amici Electronic Frontier
Foundation and the ACLU, have also attacked this decision on first amendment free
speech grounds. Id. at 252–53. As noted in the majority opinion: “[The United States
Supreme Court has held that] the First Amendment trumps a state’s power to make and
enforce defamation torts.” Id. at 253 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 277 (1964)). The scope of this Casenote’s focus is not to analyze the first
amendment issues. For a complete and detailed analysis on these claims and the trial
court’s ruling on the first amendment issues, see The Long Arm of Cyber-Reach, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1610, 1623–25 (1999) (arguing that “the judicial enforcement of trespass
laws in order to censor Internet speech constitutes state action”).
25. As the court in Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek explained:
[A]t early common law, trespass required a physical touching of another’s
chattel or entry onto another’s land. The modern rule recognizes an indirect
touching or entry; e.g., dust particles from a cement plant that migrate onto
another’s real and personal property may give rise to trespass. But the
requirement of a tangible has been relaxed almost to the point of being
discarded. Thus, some courts have held that microscopic particles or smoke
may give rise to trespass. And the California Supreme Court has intimated
migrating intangibles (e.g., sound waves) may result in a trespass, provided
they do not simply impede an owner’s use or enjoyment of property, but cause
damage.
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 n.6 (1996) (citations omitted).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (1965).
One who commits a trespass to a chattel is subject to liability to the possessor
of the chattel if, but only if, (a) he dispossesses the other of the chattel, or (b)
the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or (c) the possessor
is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or (d) bodily harm is
caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the
possessor has a legally protected interest.
Id. The rule that trespass to chattels requires some actual damage, while actual damage
is assumed in a trespass to real property case, is based on the fact that there is no legal
recovery for harmless intermeddlings to a chattel. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 64.
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succeed on grounds of trespass to chattels, it must prove either actual
physical injury to the chattel itself or a dispossession or disruption of
that chattel.27
California cases faithfully follow the common law and also require
actual injury to the chattel as an element of the tort.28 In fact, a
California court of appeal recently reaffirmed this requirement stating:
“Trespass to chattel, although seldom employed as a tort theory in
California . . . , lies where an intentional interference with the possession
of personal property has proximately caused injury.”29
As pointed out in the dissenting opinion, Prosser and Keeton’s treatise
also confirms the notion that:
trespass to chattel requires actual damage before the trespass is actionable:
Another departure from the original rule of the old writ of trespass concerns
the necessity of some actual damage to the chattel before the action can be
maintained. Where the defendant merely interferes without doing any
harm—as where, for example, he merely lays hands upon the plaintiff’s
horse, or sits in his car—there has been a division of opinion among the
writers, and a surprising dearth of authority. . . . Such scanty authority as
there is, however, has considered that the dignitary interest in the
(Kolkey, J., dissenting) (citing CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp.
1015, 1023 (S.D. Ohio 1999)). Intentional intermeddling
with another’s chattel is subject to liability only [when that] intermeddling is
harmful to the possessor’s materially valuable interest in the physical
condition, quality, or value of the chattel, or if the possessor is deprived of the
use of the chattel for a substantial time, or some other legally protected interest
of the possessor is affected.
Id. (quoting CompuServe Inc., 962 F. Supp. at 1023 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 218 cmt. e (1965))). An owner of a chattel is awarded “sufficient legal
protection” from harmless intermeddlings based on the ability to use “reasonable force
to protect” the chattel against harmless interference. Id.
27. Recall that the California Supreme Court has held that all intangible intrusions
that do not cause physical damage to the plaintiff’s property must be dealt with as a
nuisance and not a trespass. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d
669, 695–96 (Cal. 1996); Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 649 P.2d 922, 924–25 (Cal.
1982); see supra note 14.
28. See, e.g., Zaslow v. Kroenert, 176 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1946); Thrifty-Tel, Inc., 54
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473; Itano v. Colonial Yacht Anchorage, 72 Cal. Rptr. 823, 827 (Ct.
App. 1968).
29. Thrifty-Tel, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473. As noted by the dissent, Thrifty-Tel
derived this definition from Itano, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 827, “which, in turn, relied on
Prosser’s treatise on torts and the California Supreme Court’s decisions in Jordan v.
Talbot, 361 P.2d 20, 27–28 (Cal. 1961), and Zaslow, 176 P.2d at 7, which themselves
relied on Prosser.” Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 259 (Kolkey, J., dissenting). Also note that
intent is an element of the tort, see Thrifty-Tel, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473, but is not at
issue here. It is undisputed that Hamidi intended his actions.
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inviolability of chattels, unlike that as to land, is not sufficiently important
to require any greater defense than the privilege of using reasonable force
when necessary to protect them. Accordingly it has been held that nominal
damages will not be awarded, and that in the absence of any actual damage
the action will not lie. This must be qualified, however, to the extent that
any loss of possession by the plaintiff is regarded as necessarily a loss of
something of value, even if only for a brief interval—so that wherever there
is found to be dispossession, as in the case of seizure of goods on
execution, the requirement of actual damage is satisfied.30

Finally, the dissent went on to point out that the Restatement (Second)
of Torts echoes the need for the plaintiff to prove actual damage to the
chattel for the tort to lie:
The interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability, unlike the similar
interest of a possessor of land, is not given legal protection by an action for
nominal damages for harmless intermeddlings with the chattel. In order that an
actor who interferes with another’s chattel may be liable, his conduct must
affect some other and more important interest of the possessor. Therefore, one
who intentionally intermeddles with another’s chattel is subject to liability only
if his intermeddling is harmful to the possessor’s materially valuable interest in
the physical condition, quality, or value of the chattel, or if the possessor is
deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or some other legally
protected interest of the possessor is affected as stated in Clause (c).31

Thus, the authority in California, whether by case law, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, or legal commentator, unambiguously
requires the showing of actual injury to the chattel.
B. Dispossession
The California courts, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, and
the Restatement (Second) of Torts provide one very narrow exception to
the actual injury requirement. This exception is applicable only when
there has been a loss of the possession of the chattel. This loss of
possession is viewed as the loss of something of value and in this way is
constructively interpreted as actual damage.32
30. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259–60 (Kolkey, J., dissenting) (quoting W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 14, at 87 (W. Page
Keeton general ed., 5th ed. 1984)) (footnotes omitted)).
31. Id. at 260 (Kolkey, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 218 cmt. e (1965)).
32. As noted by the dissent, comment (d) of section 218 provides that: “Where the
trespass to the chattel is a dispossession, the action will lie although there has been no
impairment of the condition, quality, or value of the chattel, and no other harm to any
interest of the possessor.” Id. (Kolkey, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 218 cmt. d (1965)). The dissent then went on to note that this exception is
confirmed by Prosser and Keeton’s treatise, which states: “[L]oss of possession by the
plaintiff is regarded as necessarily a loss of something of value, even if only for a brief
interval—so that wherever there is found to be dispossession . . . the requirement of
actual damage is satisfied.” Id. (Kolkey, J., dissenting) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET

468

PRINTERMARSHALL.DOC

1/30/2020 11:11 AM

[VOL. 40: 461, 2003]

Intel Corp. v. Hamidi
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Therefore, in order to maintain a cause of action for the tort of trespass
to chattels in California, a plaintiff must prove either (1) actual injury to
the chattel or (2) loss of possession.33
C. Departure from the Legal Standard
1. Discarding the Actual Injury and Dispossession Requirements
Despite authority to the contrary, the court applied trespass to chattels
to the transmittal of Hamidi’s unsolicited e-mail where Intel was unable
to show any actual injury to the chattel or any loss of possession that the
court could deem actual damage.
Intel’s computer equipment (the chattel) indisputably was not
physically harmed by Hamidi’s e-mail messages. Further, there was no
dispossession of or disruption to the computer equipment.34 Intel was
not even dispossessed momentarily of its servers, and at no time was the
system ever injured in its condition, quality, or value. The chattel was
never rendered unavailable; thus, there was no actual harm caused to any
legally protected interest held by Intel.35 The complete failure to allege
or to support a showing of actual harm or actual dispossession should
have precluded the application of the trespass to chattels doctrine, and
the court should have denied Intel’s prayer for injunctive relief.
Nevertheless, the court stated: “Even assuming Intel has not demonstrated
sufficient ‘harm’ needed in order to trigger entitlement to nominal
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 14, at 87 (W. Page Keeton general
ed., 5th ed. 1984)).
33. The court in Hamidi cited an English treatise that states: “[T]respass to chattels
is actionable per se without any proof of actual damage.” Id. at 249 (quoting R.F.V.
HEUSTON, SALMOND AND HEUSTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 6.2 (21st ed. 1996)). The
treatise the court cited gives examples such as the snatching of a customer’s handbag for
a few moments or the showing of a private letter to an unauthorized person that amount
to trespass. Id. However, as the dissent suggested, the court overlooked that this
authority supports the alternative requirement to actual damages—“complete
dispossession.” Id. at 263 (Kolkey, J., dissenting); see also supra note 32. The majority
also cited an additional English treatise that it believed supported its holding. Hamidi,
114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249 (citing J.F. CLERK, CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS § 13-159 (17th
ed. 1995)). However, the dissent responded that “that treatise acknowledges that ‘[i]t has
been judicially asserted that even an intentional interference without asportation is not
actionable unless some harm ensues’ and simply states that textbook writers argue to the
contrary.” Id. at 263 (Kolkey, J., dissenting) (quoting J.F. CLERK, CLERK & LINDSELL ON
TORTS § 13-159, at 703 (17th ed. 1995) (alteration in original)). Therefore, the court’s
English authorities clearly agree with California law.
34. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260–61 (Kolkey, J., dissenting).
35. Id.
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damages . . . it showed [the defendant] was disrupting its business by
using its property and therefore is entitled to injunctive relief based on a
theory of trespass to chattels.”36
2. Grasping for Harm: Attenuated or Indirect Harms
The court of appeal based its injunction on an attenuated harm theory
by stating that the injury to Intel was “the loss of productivity caused by
the thousands of employees distracted from their work [by the e-mail
messages] and by the time its security department spent trying to halt the
distractions after [the defendant] refused to respect Intel’s request to
stop . . . sending unwanted e-mails.”37
Evidence that Intel employees paid attention to Hamidi’s e-mail
messages and were thereby distracted from their tasks cannot be viewed,
as this court seems to have viewed it, as amounting to the requisite
actual injury. Such distraction and loss of productivity is not an injury
to the server itself or even to its ability to properly function. It is
undisputed that Intel’s computers were in no way damaged or even
slowed down by the minuscule amount of data that Hamidi sent to
Intel.38 Reading an e-mail message transmitted to equipment designed to
receive it, in and of itself, does not affect the possessory interest in the
equipment. Intel’s alleged loss of productivity of those employees who
either read or took the time to delete the e-mail messages sent on six
different occasions over a nearly two-year period cannot qualify as an
injury of the type that gives rise to a trespass to chattels. “If that is
injury, then every unsolicited communication that does not further the
business’s objectives (including telephone calls) interferes with the
chattel to which the communication is directed simply because it must
be read or heard, distracting the recipient.”39 As noted by the dissent,
attenuated harms of this nature are outside the scope of the injury against
36. Id. at 249. As the dissent noted, if the transmittal of an unsolicited e-mail
causes no injury to the condition, value, or operation of the chattel (or to the possessory
interest therein) then it is unclear just what harm the injunction is designed to avoid. Id.
at 261 (Kolkey, J., dissenting). Just because an injunction was sought instead of actual
damages does not mean the plaintiff is free from the burden of proving any injury. Id.
(Kolkey, J., dissenting). In fact, an injunction is granted where damages are insufficient,
not nonexistent. Injunctive relief requires a “showing that the defendant’s wrongful act
constitutes an actual or threatened injury to property or personal rights that cannot be
compensated by an ordinary damage award.” Id. (Kolkey, J., dissenting) (quoting 5 B.
E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 782 (4th ed. 1997)). Thus, the plaintiff must still
prove harm to the chattel even though an injunction was sought.
37. Id. at 250.
38. Id. (dismissing the amicus argument that the receipt of the six e-mail messages
over a two-year period does not disrupt or harm Intel’s computer systems by finding the
loss of productivity to be the harm to Intel).
39. Id. at 261 (Kolkey, J., dissenting).
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which the trespass to chattels tort is designed to protect.40
Intel’s efforts and the costs it expended trying to prevent the alleged
trespass also cannot amount to the required injury. As the dissent
noted: “[I]t is circular [reasoning] to premise the required damage
element of a tort solely upon the steps taken to prevent the damage.
Injury can only be established by the completed tort’s consequences,
not by the cost of the steps taken to avoid the injury and prevent the
tort; otherwise, [a plaintiff could] create an injury for every supposed
tort.”41
In granting the injunction, the court trivialized the necessity of actual
injury to the chattel. Intel had not proved any actual damage. The
alleged employee distraction or loss of employee productivity could not
masquerade as actual injury to its servers. Consider the following
illustrative example given in Hamidi’s review petition to the Supreme
Court of California,42 emphasizing the importance of the common law
requirements:
Historically, cows have been identified as “chattel,” and a trespass to chattel
claim could lie for chasing or physically interfering with an owner’s cows or
cattle. Imagine that a farmer owns a number of cows, and employs several
people to milk them. The farmer’s neighbor, however, believes that the farmer
mistreats his employees and that they should quit their jobs or demand higher
wages. The neighbor approaches the farmer’s property and stands just outside
the fence dividing the farmer’s property from his own, and within earshot of the
employees (who are busily milking cows), the neighbor begins shouting to the
employees that they should quit their jobs and demand higher wages. The
farmer pauses from his work and demands that his neighbor stop shouting; the
neighbor persists. Meanwhile, the employees pause from their work—clearly
reducing their productivity—in order to listen to the neighbor’s impassioned
message. The cows, for their part, are unaffected, staring vacantly forward in a
bovine trance.
Should the farmer sue his neighbor for trespass to chattel? It is safe to
assume that prior to Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, nobody would have suggested
such a thing, but now the farmer can clearly make out every element of the
tort. The neighbor’s behavior is intentional; he persisted in this behavior
despite the farmer’s demand that he stop; the sounds waves emanating from
the neighbor’s mouth and impinging on the cows are every bit as tangible as
electrons (indeed, much more tangible, as sound waves can be perceived by
the senses, while electrons cannot); and the employees have clearly suffered a
loss of productivity. The only thing preventing a trespass action here is

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Petition for Review, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Ct. App.
2002) (No. C033076), available at http://www.intelhamidi.com/supremepetition.htm
(last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
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judicial recognition of the absurdity of applying trespass to chattel in such a
situation, where the chattel (cows) are completely unaffected.43

Apparently, the court in Hamidi did not view the outcome of its
decision in light of this illustration when they departed from established
requirements of trespass to chattel.
IV. ERRONEOUS READING OR DISREGARD FOR CALIFORNIA CASE LAW
A. Erroneous Reading
The court’s decision is based on an erroneous reading of existing
California case law. The first California case to apply the common law
doctrine of trespass to chattels in a computer context was Thrifty-Tel,
Inc. v. Bezenek.44 The court in Hamidi purportedly relied on this case
for its proposition that Hamidi’s unsolicited e-mail messages were
actionable under a trespass to chattels claim. However, the court in
Hamidi did not give true effect to the Thrifty-Tel decision and relied
solely on the seriously flawed reading of a footnote within the case.
In Thrifty-Tel, two young computer hackers hacked into the plaintiff’s
computer system in order to obtain access and authorization codes for
Thrifty-Tel’s long distance telephone service to enable them to make
free long distance phone calls. In order to obtain the codes, the hackers
ran search programs on the plaintiff’s system.45 The searches overburdened
the telephone system, and, as a result, some authorized subscribers were
unable to access the network to make calls.46 The court applied trespass
to chattels based on its reading of California case law, Prosser and
Keeton’s treatise on torts, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts.47 In
Thrifty-Tel the plaintiffs met the requirement of actual injury because the
defendants had overburdened the telephone system, effectively denying
some paid subscribers access to the phone lines.48
In Hamidi the court inexplicably focused on a footnote in the ThriftyTel decision instead of following the elements of trespass to chattels set
43. Id.
44. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1996).
45. Id. at 471.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 473; see infra Part III.A–B (discussing the actual physical injury,
dispossession, or disruption to the chattel prerequisites to the trespass to chattels tort).
Thrifty-Tel actually brought their claim based on conversion and not trespass to chattels
because the latter tort had yet to be actionable in this context. Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 472–73. However, the court recognized that conversion was not applicable in this
setting. Conversion requires that the loss of an intangible property interest be reflected
in something tangible that can be physically taken, so the court sua sponte raised the
trespass to chattel claim for Thrifty-Tel. Id.
48. Id. at 471.
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forth in the text of the decision. In this footnote the Thrifty-Tel court had
said: “In our view, the electronic signals generated by the [defendants’]
activities were sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of
action.”49 The Hamidi court based its decision solely on this footnote
and concluded that the e-mail messages from Hamidi alone, without any
associated physical disruption to the chattel itself, were sufficiently
tangible to support a trespass cause of action. The court read this
footnote out of context and drew from it principles that could not
logically be drawn. The court’s reading of this footnote was in
opposition to the text of the Thrifty-Tel decision and in opposition to the
cases the Thrifty-Tel court relied on to reach that decision. The ThriftyTel holding should have been read as it was intended to be read, that
electronic signals are “sufficiently tangible to support a cause of
action”—but only when an actual injury is found.50
Following the Thrifty-Tel decision, other courts applied the trespass to
chattels doctrine to computer systems only after faithfully following the
guidelines set out in Thrifty-Tel. For example, in CompuServe Inc. v.
Cyber Promotions, Inc., a federal district court found that the transmittal
of unsolicited bulk e-mail advertisements burdened CompuServe’s
computer equipment and diminished its goodwill. The court therefore
held that the defendant had denied CompuServe its possessory interest in
its computer network to the extent that the defendant interfered with its
operation, and thus diminished the value of its chattel, the computer
servers.51 The court found both harm to the actual chattel and an
interference with the possession of that chattel. America Online, Inc.
successfully maintained a similar claim where the court used similar
reasoning.52 The dissent in Hamidi cited two other prior federal district
49. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 251 (Ct. App. 2001) (quoting
Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 n.6), review granted, 43 P.3d 587 (Cal. 2002).
50. The court’s reading of this footnote is also in opposition to the California
Supreme Court’s holding that all intangible intrusions that do not cause physical damage
to plaintiff’s property must be dealt with as a nuisance and not a trespass. San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 695 (Cal. 1996); Wilson v. Interlake
Steel Co., 649 P.2d 922, 924 (Cal. 1982).
51. CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017, 1022,
1027 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
52. See America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448–49, 451
(E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that defendants transmitted more than ninety-two million
unsolicited e-mail advertisements over a five-day period, thereby “impairing the
functioning of [the plaintiff’s] e-mail system”); America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp.
2d 548, 550 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that the defendants sent over sixty million
unsolicited e-mail advertisements, which “burdened [the plaintiff’s] equipment”); see
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court cases, Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.53 and eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s
Edge, Inc.,54 for the proposition that “where the unauthorized search of,
and retrieval of information from, [the plaintiff’s] databases reduced the
computer system’s capacity, slowing response times and reducing
system performance,” it amounted to sufficient actual injury to sustain a
claim of trespass to chattel. In fact, the dissent remarked that each and
every appellate court that has applied trespass to chattels in the computer
or cyber context has done so only where the actual chattel or the
possessory interest in that chattel was impaired as to its condition or
value.55 As the dissent indicated, no other case before Hamidi ignored
the element of actual injury or replaced it with an element of attenuated
harm that does not touch and concern the chattel.56
Because Intel simply did not suffer any impairment of the chattel’s
condition or value or of the possessory interest in that chattel that would place
Hamidi’s acts within the scope of existing case law, the decision in Hamidi is
different from all other cases that have applied trespass to chattel in this
context. Therefore, the Hamidi decision is a departure from traditional
notions of trespass to chattels, a departure from legal precedent, and a
departure from the weight of legal authority, perhaps based solely on the
flawed reading of a footnote.
B. Disregard in the Name of Adaptation
Perhaps understanding that its decision would be a departure from all
existing case law and authority, the court may have attempted to excuse itself
with the adage, “[t]he common law adapts to human endeavor.”57 Although it
is true that common law doctrines should evolve and adapt to new situations,
the court’s departure is far more than evolution or mere adaptation. The
court’s decision is the spontaneous creation of a new tort, one that differs
vastly in substance and policy from the tort from which it allegedly evolved.
In biblical proportions, the court has taken a new wine, placed it in an old
also Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., No. C98-20064 JW C-98 JW PVT ENE,
1998 WL 388389, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (finding that defendants caused tens
of thousands of misdirected e-mail messages to be transmitted to plaintiff, thereby
“filling up [the plaintiff’s] computer storage space and threatening to damage [the
plaintiff’s] ability to service its legitimate customers”).
53. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
54. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
55. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 259 (Ct. App. 2001) (Kolkey, J.,
dissenting), review granted, 43 P.3d 587 (Cal. 2002).
56. Id. (Kolkey, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 247. The majority must clearly recognize their departure from the
existing law, which may be why the court goes into a lengthy discussion on the power of
the court to modify common law doctrines. However, this power is not unbridled and
should be kept within the bounds that it was intended.
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bottle, and clearly the bottle has burst.58
The court’s justification did not stop with adages. The court further
attempted to justify its departure from the common law as appropriate in this
circumstance because, as the court stated, “[w]e conceive of no public
benefit from this wasteful cat-and-mouse game which justifies depriving
Intel of an injunction.”59 However, the majority improperly balanced the
benefits that would come to the public if Intel was denied an injunction. As
Justice Kolkey explained in the dissent, the issuance of an injunction in this
case “would expand the tort of trespass to chattel in untold ways and to
unanticipated circumstances.”60
Not only did the court deviate vastly from the existing case law
regarding trespass to chattels, but it also failed to satisfactorily explain
why it was a proper time to make such a deviation. As the dissent noted,
the court’s removal, or perhaps relaxation, of the actual injury requirement
did not merely adapt the tort, but “chang[ed] its nature.”61 As Justice
Kolkey went on to explain, to “dispense[] with the requirement of injury
to the value, operation, or condition of the chattel, or the possessory
58. The new wine into old bottles analogy comes from a biblical parable that
states: “Neither do men put new wine into old bottles: else the bottles break, and the
wine runneth out, and the bottles perish: but they put new wine into new bottles, and
both are preserved.” Matthew 9:17. Here the new wine is Hamidi’s unsolicited
messages which caused no actual injury to, or loss of possession of, chattel. The old
bottle is the common law tort of trespass to chattel. Clearly, the old bottle is not suited to
handle this new wine. See Susan M. Ballantine, Computer Network Trespasses: Solving
New Problems with Old Solutions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 209, 212, 248 (2000)
(arguing that “it is incorrect to apply the trespass to chattels theory to cases in which
private network providers, specifically employers, seek to protect their interests in their
computer networks” and “failure to allege or to support a showing of actual harm should
have precluded Intel from prevailing on a trespass to chattels theory”); see also infra Part
V.A–B. The dissent in Hamidi argued that such a departure from the common law
doctrine is best handled by legislative action as opposed to judicial policymaking.
Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 264 (Kolkey, J., dissenting). In fact, the California
Legislature has stepped forward and labeled the appropriate bottles into which this new
wine should be poured. As indicated by the dissent, the California Legislature has
“restrict[ed] the e-mailing of unsolicited advertising materials” (which this is not), id. at
264 (Kolkey, J., dissenting) (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17538.4, 17538.45), and
has granted “a civil remedy to those who suffer damage or loss from . . . the
unauthorized access to a computer system,” id. (Kolkey, J., dissenting) (citing CAL.
PENAL CODE § 502(e)(1)). These statutes show the legislature’s recognition of needed
protection in this area but, in the dissent’s view, also show by failure to extend these new
actions to noncommercial or noninjurious messages, a “deliberate decision” not to hold
actionable the acts of Hamidi. Id. (Kolkey, J., dissenting).
59. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249.
60. Id. at 259 (Kolkey, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 264 (Kolkey, J., dissenting).
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interest therein, [is to] extend the tort’s scope in a way that loses sight of
its purpose.”62 Its purpose is to provide recovery “for interferences with
the possession of chattels” which do not quite rise to the level of a
conversion.63
V. ABSURD RESULTS AND ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES
A. Absurd Results
The court’s application of trespass to chattels to Hamidi’s electronic
signals, which did not in any way damage or interfere with the value or
operation of the chattel allegedly trespassed upon, expanded the tort to
include many unanticipated, unwanted, and even absurd situations.64
If Hamidi’s e-mail messages constituted trespass to Intel’s chattels as
the court held, then trespass is actionable in a number of other absurd
situations. Under this newly created tort, all unwanted mail delivered by
the U.S. Postal Service would amount to a trespass to chattels, for it is
intentionally placed in the recipient’s mailbox, the chattel is interfered
with, and the recipient suffers the same injury as Intel, that is, the lost
time that it takes to read and discard these solicitations. All e-mail
messages, whether jokes, chain letters, or personal correspondences
from a subjectively unwanted sender would be actionable for the same
reasons.
Telephone solicitations would trespass the recipient’s
telephone or answering machine, based on the time spent on the phone
deleting the message, listening to the message, or the space occupied on
the answering machine. Even television and radio broadcasts would
amount to trespass on the owner’s stereo receiver or television anytime
the recipient received signals subjectively held undesirable, the harm
being the distraction and the use of bandwidth that could otherwise be
put to more valuable uses.65
62. Id.
63. Thrifty Tel., Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (1996) (quoting W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 14, at 87 (W. Page
Keeton general ed., 5th ed. 1984)). The Prosser and Keeton treatise refers to trespass to
chattels as “a little brother of conversion.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 14, at 86 (W. Page Keeton general ed., 5th ed. 1984).
64. See Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259 (Kolkey, J., dissenting).
65. Intel argued that these types of examples can be distinguished because Intel
had ordered Hamidi to stop e-mailing its employees, thus giving Hamidi notice of the
trespass. Id. at 261 (Kolkey, J., dissenting). However, merely giving notice does not end
the possibility of absurd results.
[S]uch a notice could also be given to television and radio stations, telephone
callers, and correspondents. Under Intel’s theory, even lovers’ quarrels could
turn into trespass suits by reason of the receipt of unsolicited letters or calls
from the jilted lover. Imagine what happens after the angry lover tells her
fiancé not to call again and violently hangs up the phone. Fifteen minutes later
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Before this court’s holding, plaintiffs would not have considered
bringing a trespass to chattels claim based on the receipt of unwanted
telephone calls, faxes, letters, radio, or television programs.66 However,
the court’s decision may invite potential plaintiffs to try, and if Hamidi
is followed, to win.
B. Adverse Consequences
The majority’s refusal to follow the common guidance in its application
of trespass to chattels also has adverse consequences for free speech on
the Internet. If, as the court of appeal held, an electronic signal alone is
sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of action even though no
physical disruption to computer equipment actually occurred,67 then any
transmission becomes actionable if the plaintiff simply objects to the
transmission before it is received. What the court failed to recognize is
that the computers that run the Internet and the servers that receive email are all, like Intel’s system, privately owned. This means that all email messages enter into private property.68 As a result, under the
Hamidi ruling almost any e-mail message could constitute an actionable
trespass.
If most e-mail messages could constitute an actionable trespass, then
the free speech landscape of the Internet would be drastically altered. Email is the primary mode of communication on the Internet, and both
courts and commentators hail the Internet as potentially the most diverse and
democratic communication medium that the world has ever known.69
The U.S. Supreme Court has praised the Internet as a “vast democratic
forum[]”70 that is “open to all comers,”71 which has created a “new

the phone rings. Her fiancé wishing to make up? No, trespass to chattel.
Id. at 261–62 (Kolkey, J., dissenting).
66. In fact, recall that even in Thrifty-Tel the plaintiff did not bring a trespass claim
even where it was appropriate, and it took a benevolent court to mold a conversion claim
into a trespass for chattel. See supra note 47.
67. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250–51.
68. See, e.g., David J. Goldstone, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the
Cyber Forum: Public Vs. Private in Cyberspace Speech, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 17
(1998).
69. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (Dalzell, J.,
supporting), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will
Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1833–43 (1995).
70. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997).
71. Id. at 880.
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marketplace of ideas”72 with “content [that] . . . is as diverse as human
thought.”73 Given the role of e-mail in cyberspace, the court of appeal’s
ruling has potentially disastrous adverse consequences to freedom of speech.
Moreover, the court of appeal’s logic threatens the existence of the
Internet itself, because, by nature, virtually every application on the
Internet must generate electronic signals. Thus, if electronic signals
alone can supply the basis for trespass to chattels, the application of the
tort is limited only by a plaintiff’s imagination. As one commentator
noted: “One can imagine the anti-commons nightmare that could ensue
on the Internet in web linking, indexing, and other routine functions if
every owner of equipment attached to the network were granted a cause
of action for the trespass of unwanted electrons on her equipment.”74
Furthermore, if
anyone should think that such trespass claims would be limited to e-mail or the
Web, similar analyses could easily be supplied for FTP, telnet, streaming audio
or video, Internet “chat” sessions, software agents, indexing “spiders,” and
many other online applications. Trespass may indeed be the all-purpose cause
of action for the Internet; the impingement of electrons . . . is inherent in
connecting a machine to the Internet.75

In short, the logic of the court of appeal’s decision stretches far beyond
the boundaries of the dispute between Intel and Mr. Hamidi. The decision
threatens both the free speech landscape of the Internet and the operation
of the Internet itself.
VI. CONCLUSION
The court in Hamidi has gone against the overwhelming weight of
authority by holding that trespass to chattels does not require injury to
the chattel or to the possessor’s legally protected interest in the chattel.
Its decision is in opposition to every judicial decision to have considered
the trespass to chattels doctrine in the computer or cyberspace context,
under which the courts have carefully limited the doctrine to those
situations where the defendant has caused real physical disruption to the
plaintiff’s computer server or computer equipment. The decision is also
inconsistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts and with Prosser and
Keeton’s leading treatise on torts. The court has created a new tort with
potentially absurd and damaging results.
Perhaps Hamidi was not a sympathetic defendant. Free speech issues
72. Id. at 885.
73. Id. at 870.
74. Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27,
49 (2000).
75. Id. at 46.
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aside, “spamming”76 is not an activity that most e-mail users would like
to see encouraged or protected. Understandably, Intel did not want
Hamidi openly contacting its employees and harassing them in an effort
to incite animosity toward their employer. Furthermore, many may
consider the unintended effects that would spill over to inhibit telephone
solicitation or bulk junk mail to be a pleasant byproduct. While that may
be true, the trespass theory has many dangerous implications that reach
far beyond spam and other unsolicited communications. As expressed in
the following words quoted by the dissent in Hamidi:
We must not throw to the winds the advantages of consistency and uniformity
to do justice in the instance. We must keep within those interstitial limits which
precedent and custom and the long and silent and almost indefinable practice of
other judges through the centuries of the common law have set to judge-made
innovations.77

The requirement that a plaintiff prove actual injury to the chattel itself
should not be set aside. The actual injury requirement has been the
standard for many years and has recently received strong support in the
few cases that have dealt with intangible trespass, thus showing the trend
is not to depart from that standard.78 Where the trespass is by something
other than physical contact, the requirement of injury is even more
important. As applied by California courts to computer networks, trespass
to chattels “lies where an intentional interference with the possession of
personal property has proximately caused injury.”79 Intel did not meet this
burden, and the court’s holding should therefore be reversed.
TYSON MARSHALL
76. The term “spam” refers broadly to unsolicited bulk e-mail (or “junk e-mail”),
“which can be either commercial (such as an advertisement) or noncommercial
(such as a joke or chain letter).” Use of the term “spam” as Internet jargon for
this seemingly ubiquitous junk e-mail arose out of a skit by the British comedy
troupe Monty Python, in which a waitress can offer a patron no single menu
item that does not include spam . . . . Hormel Food Corporation, which
debuted its SPAM® luncheon meat in 1937, has dropped any defensiveness
about this use of the term and now celebrates its product with a website . . . .
State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 406 n.1 (Wash. 2001) (citations omitted).
77. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 258 (Ct. App. 2001) (Kolkey, J.,
dissenting) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 103
(1921)) (footnote omitted), review granted, 43 P.3d 587 (Cal. 2002).
78. See supra Part IV.A. and notes 47–49.
79. Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473–74 (Ct. App. 1996).
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